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Abstract

On March 24th 2004, the European Commission issued its long awaited Microsoft
decision, which has now been published on its Website.1 On April 29th 2004, the
Court of Justice handed down its judgment in the IMS Health case.2 Both decisions have important implications for all companies with valuable IP portfolios
that do business in the European Union. Although these decisions are arguably
not revolutionary given the existing legal framework for dominant companies set
out in Article 82 EC, they illustrate that EC competition law sometimes strikes a
different balance than US antitrust law between spurring innovation by protecting
IP rights and promoting competition in innovation-driven markets.
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Interesting times for IP holders in Europe:
The implications of Microsoft and IMS Health

n March 24th 2004, the European Commission issued its long awaited Microsoft
decision, which has now been published on
its Website.1 On April 29th 2004, the Court of Justice
handed down its judgment in the IMS Health case.2 Both
decisions have important implications for all companies
with valuable IP portfolios that do business in the European Union. Although these decisions are arguably
not revolutionary given the existing legal framework
for dominant companies set out in Article 82 EC, they
illustrate that EC competition law sometimes strikes a
different balance than US antitrust law between spurring innovation by protecting IP rights and promoting
competition in innovation-driven markets.
In this bulletin, we examine (i) the Commission’s
treatment of tying issues with respect to Microsoft’s
Windows Media Player; (ii) the Commission’s analysis
of Microsoft’s withholding of interoperability speciﬁcations for workgroup server operating systems; and (iii)
the Court of Justice’s pronouncements on refusals by
dominant companies to license IP rights in IMS Health.
In each case, we outline the principal arguments, place
them in the existing framework of Article 82 EC, compare them to US antitrust law, and comment on their
possible implications for future cases.

I. Microsoft’s tying of the Windows operating
system with the Windows Media Player
1. The Commission’s decision
Since 1999, Microsoft has licensed its successive versions of Windows operating systems (OS)
only in a bundle with its own Windows Media
Player (“WMP”).3 The Commission found this to
constitute illegal tying under Article 82 (d) EC. In
the Commission’s view, this practice amounts to an
abuse of Microsoft’s dominant position in the PC
OS market. The Commission ordered Microsoft to
unbundle the two products by making available to PC
OEM manufacturers a version of its OS that does not
include WMP code.
Having – unsurprisingly – concluded that Microsoft holds a dominant position in the PC OS market,
the Commission ﬁrst found that “streaming” media
players constitute a market separate from PC OS. To
support this ﬁnding, the Commission relied, among
other things, on evidence of demand for streaming
media players separate from OS’s (mostly through
free Internet downloads), as well as the existence
of specialized media player vendors such as Real
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http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf
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Case C-418/01 IMS Health v. NDC Health, nyr.
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Finally, the Commission considered, but ultimately
rejected, several “objective justiﬁcations” that Microsoft proffered. As to distribution efﬁciencies, the
Commission noted that the same efﬁciencies could be
obtained if Microsoft offered OEMs the choice whether
to include WMP or another media player with PCs they
ship. As to possible efﬁciencies resulting from content
and applications developers being able to place calls to
WMP’s application programming interfaces (“API”),
the Commission also found that such efﬁciencies could
also be realized without tying, i.e., by OEMs deciding
on their own to pre-install WMP if the latter offers the
best functionality.

Networks (RealPlayer) and Apple (QuickTime). The
Commission rejected Microsoft’s argument that there
is no consumer demand for OS without a media player.
It found that, absent Microsoft’s bundling, PC OEMs
could meet consumer demand for a pre-installed media
player by supplying the OS with a media player other
than WMP.
Next, the Commission found that Microsoft’s
refusal to license to OEMs its Windows OS without
WMP constituted tying within the meaning of Article
82(d) EC. In particular, the Commission observed that
although OEMs were free to install additional media
player software, they were unable technically to uninstall WMP. It also rejected Microsoft’s argument
that the WMP is included in Windows without “extra
charge”, because (i) a charge for WMP might be “hidden” in the Windows/WMP bundled price; and (ii) the
pricing issue was in any event irrelevant to the foreclosure concerns that drive the rules against tying.

2. Comparison with EC precedent
Given existing Article 82 EC precedent, such as
Hilti4 and Tetra Pak II,5 it is arguably not surprising
that the Commission concluded that tying Windows
with WMP constitutes an abuse. Indeed, in analyzing in
detail the actual foreclosure effects of Microsoft’s tying
practices, the Commission seems to have taken a less
strict view of Article 82’s tying prohibitions than the
Community courts in recent decisions. For example,
in Michelin II and British Airways, the Court of First
Instance determined that for less exclusionary forms
of bundling (pricing incentives), the Commission need
not show that bundling actually led to foreclosure so
long as the conduct in question is likely to have such
an effect.6 The Commission’s dismissal of the objective
justiﬁcations offered by Microsoft seems consistent
with the Community courts’ strict scrutiny of such
justiﬁcations in previous tying cases.7

The Commission then undertook an extensive analysis of the foreclosure effects of tying WMP to Windows. It
found that given the ubiquity of Microsoft’s OS, suppliers
of other media players cannot gain comparable access
to customers’ PCs. Although the Commission examined
other distribution channels (e.g., Internet downloading
and OEM installation agreements), it concluded that none
could match the penetration of Windows OS.
The Commission also found the ubiquity of WMP
to create incentives for content providers and software
developers to encode their products using only WMP
technology. According to the Commission, the rapid
growth of WMP to the detriment of competing media
players (measured, e.g., on the basis of player usage,
format usage, content offered by websites, installed
base) shows the exclusionary effects of Microsoft’s
practice. (Elsewhere in the decision, the Commission
also notes the potential “chilling effect” of WMP-style
bundling on software developers seeking to develop
additional functionalities whose markets would be preempted if Microsoft decided to integrate comparable
functions into Windows.)

3. Comparison with US antitrust law
Some US commentators have criticized the
Commission’s Microsoft decision – including its tying analysis and the remedies imposed – as hostile to
innovation and out of step with US antitrust law. On
closer inspection, however, the decision does not seem
to diverge signiﬁcantly from US tying law.

4

Case T-30/89 Hilti v. Commission [1991] ECR II-1439.

5

Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v. Commission [1996] ECR I-5951 (“Tetra Pak II”).

6

Case T-203/01 Michelin v. Commission, nyr (para. 241); Case T-219/99 British Airways v. Commission, nyr. (para. 293).
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See, e.g., Tetra Pak II supra note 5.
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4. Implications for future cases

As regards Microsoft’s tying, the US Department
of Justice (DOJ) and many States brought their own
antitrust action against Microsoft in 1998, alleging
among other things that Microsoft illegally bundled
Windows OS with its Internet Explorer web browser.
That case focused on an allegation under Section
2 of the Sherman Act that Microsoft had sought to
eliminate the Netscape Navigator browser to protect
its quasi monopoly in the PC OS market. However,
the Government also relied on a tying theory under
Section 1. Although the district court ruled for the
plaintiffs on the tying claim,8 the court of appeals
reversed on the ground that the district court wrongly
applied the per-se rule to tying practices involving
the complex markets for platform and applications
software.9

In terms of precedent setting, the primary
signiﬁcance of the Commission’s decision (if upheld
by the Community Courts) is its implications for
Microsoft’s future plans to include additional sets of
functionalities into its next OS release (code-named
“Longhorn”), for example virus protection and search
engine functionalities. While the Commission’s
decision sets out the analytical framework under
Article 82 EC if Microsoft decides to incorporate
such functionalities into Longhorn, it is not
necessarily dispositive for the outcome of any such
future investigation. The Commission’s analysis of
foreclosure effects and possible efﬁciencies of tying
WMP is highly fact speciﬁc. It is therefore conceivable
that the analysis could be different depending on the
functionality in question and on developments in the
dynamically evolving software industry over time.
For instance, as broadband Internet access proliferates
and users’ sophistication in downloading software
increases, the foreclosure effects of tying additional
functionalities to Microsoft’s OS may no longer be
viewed as signiﬁcant. If Microsoft can show that
efﬁciencies from integration outweigh relatively
limited foreclosure effects, it might be able to avoid
liability under Article 82 EC.

The court of appeals explicitly left open the possibility that the plaintiffs could succeed under a rule of
reason analysis on remand. Since the plaintiffs later
abandoned their tying claim, it is not clear how the US
courts would have applied the rule of reason.
Further, the “WMP code removal” remedy that
the Commission imposed arguably does not go much
further than the unbundling remedy in the settlement
between Microsoft and the Government that the
district court approved in November 2002.10 Under
the settlement, Microsoft must provide means for
enabling OEMs and end-users to hide the icon and
entries representing the WMP application on the
computer screen, but Microsoft is not required to
remove code.

The possible implications of the Commission’s
decision outside of Microsoft’s OS are more
speculative. Few markets -- in or outside the software
industry -- exhibit the degree of market power and
network effects that Microsoft enjoys in PC OS. In
terms of network effects, platform software for mobile
devices may have comparable potential, but as yet
no dominant provider of such platform software has
emerged.

As a formal matter, that the US settlement did
not require code removal can be explained by the
fact that the settlement remedies were not designed to
remedy tying as such. As a matter of substance, the
Commission’s insistence on unbundling through code
removal is based on its ﬁnding that parallel installation
of two players would impose substantial support costs
on OEMs, so that they would rarely if ever choose
to install non-Microsoft media players in addition to
WMP. Whether or not the Commission is right as a
factual matter, the EC remedy does not represent a
fundamental difference in approach to that of the US
agencies or courts.
8

http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4400/4469.htm
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http://ecfp.cadc.uscourts.gov/MS-Docs/1720/0.pdf
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More generally, though ultimately of no avail to
Microsoft, the Commission’s willingness to at least
consider arguments about the absence of foreclosure
and redeeming virtues of prima facie abusive practices
may foreshadow a somewhat more economically
rigorous approach to Article 82 EC enforcement
by the Commission. The Commission’s forthcoming
notice on the subject will shed more light on its
intentions.
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exceeds 60 %. In addition, it emphasized the close
links with the market for PC operating systems due to
interoperability requirements. Referring in particular to
the Tetra Pak II judgment, it inferred from those links
that Microsoft should be considered dominant in both
markets. Nevertheless, it appears that the Commission
links Microsoft’s abusive behavior primarily to its
dominance in the market for PC OS.

II. Microsoft’s withholding of interoperability
speciﬁcations for workgroup sever operating
systems
1. The Commission’s decision
The Commission also determined that Microsoft
had infringed Article 82 EC by abusing its dominance
in the desktop and workgroup server OS markets in
order to achieve and maintain dominance in the latter
market. The Commission found that Microsoft had
refused to supply Sun Microsystems and other rivals
with the speciﬁcations for protocols that Windows work
group servers use. By refusing to do so, Microsoft kept
those companies from implementing such speciﬁcations
to develop fully interoperable work group sever OS
products. As a remedy, the Commission ordered
Microsoft to provide all interested parties with the
necessary interoperability speciﬁcations within 120
days on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.

The Commission found that Microsoft had abused
its dominant position by refusing to supply speciﬁcations
for both client-to-server and server-to-server protocols
that would enable competing server OS software to fully
interoperate with the Windows domain architecture. It
reached this conclusion despite its explicit recognition
that disclosure of the relevant protocols could impinge
on Microsoft’s intellectual property rights. Although
recognizing that refusals to license intellectual property
can constitute an abuse only in exceptional circumstances,
the Commission refused to be bound by an “exhaustive
checklist” of such circumstances as set out in Magill11 or
other judgments by the Community courts.

The Commission found Microsoft dominant not
only in the market for PC OS, but also in the market for
work group server OS delivering ﬁle, print and group
and user administration services in small to mediumsized networks. Microsoft vigorously argued that there
is not a separate market for such a narrow category
of server OS. (Microsoft has a much weaker market
position for other types of server OS, in particular for
high-end servers.) The company argued that the same
OS could be used for all types of servers regardless
of what tasks the servers performed, and that OS for
higher-end types of servers could easily be “slimmed
down” to be sold as work group server OS.

Here, the Commission found the following facts
to constitute exceptional circumstances justifying the
ﬁnding of an abuse. First, Microsoft’s refusal to disclose
protocol speciﬁcations amounted to a disruption of
“previous levels of supply”. In particular, the Commission
found that Microsoft made such disclosures before
it had a credible server OS offering, but deliberately
discontinued them after it developed one in order to
disadvantage its rivals. Second, Microsoft’s refusal
to disclose protocol speciﬁcations risked eliminating
competition in the work group server OS market, as
demonstrated by Microsoft’s “rapid rise to dominance”
in that market. Third, the Commission emphasized that
interoperability disclosures were indispensable for rivals
to compete, and that open industry standards supported
in Windows, the distribution of client-side software
by the server OS vendor, or reverse engineering of
Microsoft’s products provided no viable substitute.
Fourth, the Commission found that Microsoft’s conduct
was not justiﬁed by the protection of its intellectual
property rights. Any disincentives for future innovation
by Microsoft resulting from the compulsory disclosure
of such IP rights would be outweighed by the substantial
promotion of competitive innovation in the market as a
whole. The Commission repeatedly pointed out that it
was not requiring Microsoft to disclose the actual source
code of its OS, but only the speciﬁcations necessary to
ensure interoperability.

The Commission responded that Microsoft itself
offers a differentiated range of server OS for different
tasks at signiﬁcantly different prices. Moreover, it
found that due to their frequent interaction with client
PCs, work group server OS require a higher degree of
interoperability than OS for other types of servers and
are thus not substitutable by other types of servers. This
also led the Commission to conclude that competitors
could not easily “scale down” OS originally designed
for higher-end servers since those usually do not offer
the same degree of interoperability with client PCs as
work group servers do.
In the market for work group server OS, the
Commission estimated that Microsoft’s market share

11

Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. Commission, [1995] ECR I-743 ("Magill")
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2. Comparison with EC precedent

make interoperability disclosures. Again, one can
distinguish between the substantive assessment of
refusals to deal and the remedies already in place with
respect to the US settlement.

In condemning Microsoft’s refusals to deal with
its competitors, the Commission relies on a series of
judgments concerning this category of abuse, namely
Commercial Solvents,12 Magill,13 Tiercé Ladbroke,14 and
Bronner15. Given the Commission’s acknowledgement
that the disclosures refused by Microsoft would likely
impinge on Microsoft’s IP rights, Magill is arguably
the precedent that is most on point. However, the facts
in Magill were quite different from those here because
the refusal concerned an input (a single channel’s
copyrighted TV listings) that was needed to market a
completely new product (a multi-channel TV guide).
Here, by contrast, complainant Sun Microsystems was
seeking the disclosure of interoperability information
to compete more effectively with an existing product
against Microsoft’s existing products.

Previous US legal proceedings against Microsoft
did not center on refusals to deal. Unlike the
Commission, the US did not allege that Microsoft
had monopolized or attempted to monopolize the
server software market. The disclosure requirements
that formed part of Microsoft’s settlement and are
discussed below were designed to remedy Microsoft’s
unlawfully maintained desktop OS monopoly by
facilitating rivals’ development of “middleware”
products that could lower the “applications barrier to
entry” and help erode the desktop monopoly.
Would a US court have found monopolization on
the basis of the Commission’s factual record? As the US
Supreme Court has recently conﬁrmed in the Trinko16
case, US antitrust law recognizes few exceptions to the
general principle that even monopolists are free to deal
with whomever they please. In particular, the Supreme
Court was unwilling to expand its previous holding in
Aspen Skiing.17 In Aspen, a ski operator controlling
three of the four mountain areas within the area had
terminated a joint selling arrangement with the much
smaller operator. It even refused to sell its tickets at
retail prices, preventing the smaller operator from
offering an all-area ski ticket. If one interprets Trinko as
limiting actionable refusals to deal to situations where
the monopolist has previously dealt with rivals on
commercial terms, it seems doubtful that a US agency
or court would have found Microsoft’s refusal to deal
to constitute a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. Notwithstanding the previous disclosures of
interoperability information by Microsoft to server
OS vendors, it did not “sell” those disclosures on a
commercial basis, and certainly not to end customers.

The Commission’s express refusal to be bound by
an “exhaustive checklist of exceptional circumstances”
justifying compulsory licensing shows that it recognizes
its decision is breaking new ground. On the other
hand, that Microsoft appears to have made sufﬁcient
interoperability information available to server OS
vendors until it had a credible product offering of its
own is a factor that was not present in Magill – there
the copyright holder had never before licensed its TV
listings. Indeed, the termination of existing supplies to
a competitor when those supplies are essential for the
competitor’s business has been condemned as abusive
by the Community Courts since Commercial Solvents
in 1974. The signiﬁcance of Microsoft’s previous
dealings with Sun and other workgroup server OS
vendors are therefore likely to be a key legal issue in
Microsoft’s appeal to the Court of First Instance.

3. Comparison with US antitrust law
Some US commentators have also criticized

As regards existing US remedies, Microsoft argued
before the Commission that its “Communications

the Commission’s assessment of Microsoft’s refusal to

12

Joined Cases 6 and 7-73, Commercial Solvents and Others v Commission, [1974] ECR 223.

13

See, e.g., Magill supra note 11.

14

Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke v Commission, [1997] ECR II-923.

15

Case C-7/97, Bronner, [1998] ECR I-7791.

16

Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. ____ (2004).

17

Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands, 472 U.S. 585.
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Protocol Program” (MCPP), which it developed
in connection with its settlement with the US
Department of Justice, was an sufﬁcient remedy
for any interoperability concerns. The Commission
disagreed. It pointed out that this program only
addresses client-to-server and not server-to-server
protocols, and was thus insufﬁcient given the
tight link between client-to-server and server-toserver interoperability. It appears that Microsoft
has recently expanded the scope of the MCPP in
response to concerns voiced by DOJ, and that Sun
as the principal complainant before the Commission
has decided to participate in MCPP as part of its
more comprehensive US$ 1.6 billion settlement with
Microsoft. It is thus unclear whether there is still a
signiﬁcant gap between MCPP and the requirements
imposed by the Commission in its decision.

step to clarifying the reach of the Magill doctrine on
compulsory licensing generally.

1. The Court’s judgment and EC precedent
The Court of Justice’s ruling in the IMS Health case
is the culmination of an ongoing saga. IMS provides
pharmaceutical companies with data on the sale of
pharmaceutical products, which is used for, among
other things, remunerating sales representatives. To
provide useful data to its customers within existing
privacy constraints, IMS had developed and copyrighted
a geographical breakdown called a “brick structure”
for processing data received from pharmaceutical
wholesalers. When IMS rival NDC tried to use a similar
brick structure in order to provide pharmaceutical data
collection services in competition with IMS, the latter
brought a successful action in German courts to block
the use of its copyrighted system. NDC complained to
the Commission, which adopted an interim decision
requiring IMS to license its brick structure to NDC. After
IMS successfully sought a suspension of the decision
from the President of the CFI (an order conﬁrmed by the
President of ECJ), the Commission eventually withdrew
the interim decision in August 2003 on the basis that the
Camera Care criteria were no longer satisﬁed as NDC
no longer needed protection. In parallel, the German
trial court hearing the copyright dispute referred to the
Court of Justice the question of whether IMS’ refusal to
license its brick structure to NDC constituted an abuse
of a dominant position under Art. 82 EC.

4. Implications for future cases
The implications of the Commission’s
pronouncements on interoperability requirements
are likely to be broader than those of its ﬁndings
on WMP bundling. The Commission’s decision
potentially means that any dominant supplier of
hardware or software is required to continue to
supply interface information to rivals offering
peripherals or accessories in competition with the
dominant supplier if the dominant supplier has
previously decided to provide such information. In
contrast, it could be argued that suppliers who have
never made interface information protected by IP
rights available to rivals might only be subject to
compulsory licensing under Article 82 EC under the
narrower circumstances of Magill, i.e., where they
are suppressing the emergence of a new product not
yet offered by the dominant supplier.

In its ruling, the Court provided some important
clariﬁcations about the exceptional conditions under
which Article 82 EC justiﬁes compulsory licensing.
First, drawing on its Bronner judgment, the Court
clariﬁed that it is not an essential element of the
Magill doctrine that the “input” that is deemed to be
essential to competing in the downstream market is
sold separately. Rather, it is sufﬁcient if the input is
part of a “potential” or even a “hypothetical” market.
For IMS, this means that it cannot defend itself solely
on the basis that it has never commercially offered
licenses to its brick structure.

III. IMS Health
When the Court of Justice handed down its
IMS Health judgment, both Microsoft and the
Commission immediately claimed that it supported
their respective legal positions. As explained
below, the better view seems to be that IMS Health
is not dispositive for the outcome of Microsoft’s
appeal. Nonetheless, IMS Health is a signiﬁcant

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING LLP
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the license “does not intend to limit itself essentially to
duplicating the goods or services already offered” by
the dominant IP right holder, but “intends to produce
new goods or services not offered by the owner of
the right and for which there is a potential consumer
demand.” There are clearly a number of ambiguities in
the Court’s language. In particular, there is an obvious
gray zone between products that are not “essentially a
duplication of existing products” and products that are
truly “new”. Given that the Court deals with a scenario
in which the “new” and existing products by deﬁnition
belong to the same (dominated) antitrust market,
signiﬁcant improvements to existing products could
arguably sufﬁce to be considered “new products”.
Moreover, the Court’s notion of an “intent” to offer new
products begs the question of how serious such intent
must be to gain access to the dominant company’s
essential inputs. It remains for future cases to resolve
these questions, so it is premature to say whether IMS
Health should be read as a limitation or expansion of
Magill, in terms of requirements on the product to be
offered by the complainant.

to deal, it thus would thus appear to widen the gap
between EC and US antitrust law.

3. Implications for future cases
In terms of its implications for the Microsoft
appeal, the IMS Health judgment is arguably not
dispositive. As mentioned above, the Commission has
not directly relied on the test set out in Magill, and its
case is thus not directly affected by any modiﬁcation
or clariﬁcation of Magill in IMS Health. Nor would
IMS Health appear to affect the Commission’s
premise that there is no “exhaustive check list” of
“exceptional circumstances” justifying compulsory
licensing. Therefore, both parties could only seek to
take comfort from certain parts of the judgment.
For instance, the Commission is likely to welcome
the Court’s clariﬁcation that there need not be an
existing market for the relevant “input”, because this
should help address arguments such as that disclosure
of interoperability information is not customary in the
software industry. Conversely, Microsoft may seek to
argue that competing server OS are not “new” products
within the meaning of IMS Health, but merely seek
to replicate functionality (including client-to-server
and server-to-server interoperability) that Microsoft’s
workgroup server operating systems already offer. At
the end of the day, it seems more likely that the Court
of First Instance will decide on the Microsoft case by
examining the speciﬁc arguments in the Commission’s
decision rather than by simply invoking IMS Health
in order to rule one way or the other.

Third, the Court agreed the complainants in the
IMS Health case that the extent to which customers had
participated in the elaboration of IMS’s brick structure
and the costs that they may incur in switching to an
alternative structure are relevant for the analysis under
Article 82, insofar as they affect the complainant’s
ability to offer a viable product in competition with
IMS. If such switching costs are fatal to a viable
competitive offering, this would imply that access to
IMS’s brick structure is in fact “indispensable” and
could thus give rise to compulsory licensing if the
other elements of the Magill test are met.

IMS Health may however have signiﬁcant general
implications for dominant IP right holders. The
Court’s statement that even a “hypothetical” market for
essential input is sufﬁcient in a compulsory licensing
context could have far-reaching consequences for
arguably dominant companies holding process
and component patents, copyrights, or other forms
of secret know-how that provide a signiﬁcant
competitive advantage. Also, as mentioned above, the
ambiguity of the Court’s “new product” and “intent”
requirements may tempt some national authorities and
courts towards a broad interpretation of compulsory
licensing requirements, in particular where Article
82 EC is invoked as a defense in patent infringement
cases. Last, the Court’s acknowledgement that

2. Comparison with US antitrust law
As pointed out above, US antitrust law is very
skeptical about refusal to deal claims. The Supreme
Court’s interpretation of its Aspen Skiing decision in the
Trinko case suggest that when the dominant company
has not previously supplied the complainant or other
companies with the essential input on commercial
terms, it will be difﬁcult to establish the conditions
necessary to make a refusal to deal actionable. To the
extent that the IMS Health judgment makes it clear
that previous commercial dealings are not an essential
requirement of Article 82 liability based on refusal
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of IP right holders with that of stimulating competition
where a proprietary technology has become the defacto industry standard. Even after the two decisions,
many issues still await clariﬁcation through further
case law, which now will be shaped by agencies and
courts throughout the EU’s 25 jurisdictions. IP right
holders doing business in Europe are well advised to
follow these developments closely.

customer involvement in developing products can
heighten the risk of compulsory licensing may in
certain cases discourage such customer involvement
with a negative impact on innovation.

IV.

Conclusion

The Commission’s Microsoft decision and the
Court’s IMS Health judgment do not mark a signiﬁcant
change in the interpretation and enforcement of Article
82 EC. However, precisely for that reason, they do
illustrate the differences in approach – sometimes
subtle, sometimes obvious – between the European
Union and the United States to balancing the interests
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